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26 October 1974

INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP

First Meeting, 1500 hrs, 25 October 1974

Minutes

11/1/74

Members Present: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC  
 [redacted] AD/DCI/IC 25X1  
 Dr. Edward W. Proctor, DDI/CIA  
 Mr. William McAfee, DD/INR/State  
 [redacted] NSA/CSS 25X1  
 Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., DD/DIA  
 [redacted] 25X1  
 (For Mr. George Carver, D/DCI/NIO)  
 [redacted] (Ret), DCI/IC/CS 25X1

Gen. Wilson, as Chairman, outlined the membership and structure of the NSCIC Working Group, emphasizing its "consumer/user/customer" orientation and the need to focus its agenda on user-oriented problems.

Dr. Proctor saw this as posing problems if the NSCIC was to be advisory to the NSC on intelligence matters which were not "user-oriented." He wondered whether the NSCIC might not need three subordinate agencies - a Working Group, an Intelligence Panel, and a Requirements Advisory Board for economic intelligence. (The NSC Staff favors making the RAB a subordinate element of the NSCIC.) Gen. Wilson indicated he would seek to lock the Working Group into matters of direct interest to them and later discuss with Gen. Scowcroft the role of other NSCIC sub-groups.

Gen. Wilson said that if the Panel is to be "the engine which pulls the NSCIC process it will need some autonomy," but he emphasized the Working Group will need intelligence support and the Intelligence Panel will be the principal vehicle for this. He wanted to keep the Panel "ahead of the curve" and would ask the Panel to meet before each Working Group session.

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Gen. Wilson recognized that Terms of Reference were important but he wanted to get a work program underway before there was any consideration of the details of Terms of Reference. There was general agreement.

25X1 [ ] commented that a problem deserving consideration was the extent the NSCIC considers intelligence should target US overseas enterprises. He noted there were both juridicial and moral problems involved in monitoring communications between US commercial interests and foreign governments, but important economic intelligence is involved.

25X1 [ ] said that presently the Attorney General must give specific authority.

Discussion then turned to a CS/ICS memorandum on "A Program for the Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group," dated 25 October.

Gen. Wilson emphasized the importance of (1) identifying matters the Intelligence Community wants guidance on, and, (2) learning from the NSCIC the major policy problems concerning which intelligence support is specially needed.

Dr. Proctor urged that the Working Group be a forum for "unloading gripes on a non-authoritative, even intuitive basis." He would ask them "What are your problems with intelligence? Give examples." He noted that too often such reports are off-hand or misreported and he would hope Working Group members could be frank and direct. [ ] agreed and emphasized that what was needed was information as to what was wrong, not how to correct it. He felt that "guidance" invited being told how to do the job. 25X1

25X1 [ ] noted that asking the customers of economic intelligence what they wanted was his job, but they just didn't know. Dr. Proctor said customers know what they want when a problem arises and the information they need is not there. He suggested it would be great if the Panel members could sit in the back while the Working Group members expressed themselves on what was wrong with intelligence. 25X1 [ ]

25X1 [ ] said the Working Group represents only "consumers of a sort" but others could feed into them.

Gen. Wilson wondered whether it would be better to pose the problem at the first Working Group meeting and seek ad hoc spontaneous response, or merely raise the matter and

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25X1 request comments for the following meeting. He favored the latter. Dr. Proctor said that on the chance the "gripe session" might "peter out" it might be well to have prepared a check list to get reactions on specific NIEs, on current intelligence, on situation reports in crisis situations, etc. [ ] felt that since "thoughtful bitches" were desired it would be better to raise the question and ask for responses at a follow-on meeting.

It was generally agreed that what was wanted was a clear picture of what the users wanted and needed, and a feedback as to the extent to which they are being satisfied.

In discussion of the Working Group role re the KIQs, it was agreed the best course would be to have the Intelligence Community prepare the KIQs (particularly in order to keep the list from getting too long) and then have the Working Group comment on the drafts.

Gen. Tighe asked how the Working Group would get its staff support, and Gen. Wilson said that ICS would provide secretarial support to the Group as a body, but each member would have to be supported by his own Staff.

Dr. Proctor said there was need for a mechanism for circulating Working Group papers to the NSCIC for endorsement.

The remaining topics in the CS memorandum were disposed of as follows:

Means of establishing and sustaining policy-maker/intelligence dialogue in time-urgent situation -- Dr. Proctor said, "this is where we start."

Needed improvements in the system of flagging warning information -- Gen. Wilson said this was procedural.

Involving intelligence consumers in post-mortems of the functioning of the Intelligence Community in particular crisis situations - Gen. Wilson said, "this is where we get to."

Procedures for keeping the Community apprised of US policy objectives which should influence the focus of intelligence collection and analysis in crisis situations -- Both Drs. Proctor and [ ] said this was a "never-never."

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Identification of the most intelligence inputs needed by military force planners and weapon systems designers for the period 10-15 years in the future -- Gen. Wilson said this would have to be approached on a gradual basis.

Dr. Proctor felt the Working Group should be asked to identify what intelligence products are not needed and can be eliminated. ✓

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[ ] raised the problems involved in getting line organizations outside the Intelligence Community to study problems on a contingency basis. He cited as an example: What if Saudi Arabia converts its dollars to marks or francs? What would that mean to the US? The problem is larger than intelligence alone. OER shouldn't do it, but Treasury isn't interested.

Gen. Wilson said he wanted to make the Working Group a "dynamic instrument" providing it seems responsive. If barriers arise, another forum would be developed. He wanted the Group to deal with "gutty" things and invoke interest, and to do that he needed the help of the Intelligence Panel. He also hoped that the Panel could develop an autonomous role and thought that it might become involved in matters which would not go to the NSCIC. He asked the members to think about an "optimum role" for the Panel. There was general approval of the concept of an active Panel from the members.

Gen. Wilson, illustrating his point that the Panel could consider other than NSCIC matters, passed out a draft DCI letter to the Director DIA regarding revision of the Watch mechanism.

Considerable discussion ensued regarding the difference between Warning with a big "W" (dealing with nuclear attack or action involving US combat forces and to be handled by a Strategic Warning Committee) and warning with a small "w" which would be handled by Alert Memoranda produced under direction of the NIOs.

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[ ] emphasized NSA's interest in warning actions based on the [ ] and mentioned the display devices which will interface six operations and intelligence centers. Gen. Wilson said the new committee arrangement in the NMIC would not interfere with such a net.

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Mr. McAfee asked if the Watch Committee and the NIC would continue, and Gen. Wilson said he saw the NMIC taking over their functions.

Dr. Proctor saw <sup>imminent?</sup> "combat risk" <sup>to the US?</sup> as the key differential between large and small "w" in the warning mechanisms.

25X1 [redacted] preferred reference to "senior representative" instead of "senior analyst."

It was agreed that on the basis of comments by Panel members the letter would be amended and re-disseminated. Panel members were to provide comments by close of business 29 October. (Copies were LDX'd to DIA, NSA and State and hand-delivered to Drs. Proctor and [redacted] at 1730 hours, 25 October.)

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Gen. Wilson also passed out copies of a draft DCI letter to the Chairman, NSCIC, on "Intelligence Warning" and indicated it would be a future Working Group agenda item. He asked for comments from Panel members within two weeks.

Gen. Wilson said he was considering a second meeting of the Working Group within ten days or so after the 30 October session. Both Dr. Proctor and Mr. McAfee counselled against "pushing too hard" and suggested that a meeting at regular intervals be avoided.

Gen. Wilson said the Panel would be assembled only when he had something useful for it to do.

The meeting adjourned at 1620 hours. No date for the next session was set.

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[redacted]  
Director, Coordination Staff

25X1 DCI/IC/CS/S [redacted] is (10/29/74)

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